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COMMENTARY




Professor Kurland's remarks take me back to May 17, 1954, when I
was in a class of Professor William Winslow Crosskey. I will always
remember when the Brown' decision came down. The class was very
eager to get his reaction to the decision. We asked him his opinion of
it. He said it was wrong, dead wrong! I had and have the highest re-
spect for Professor Crosskey.2 I have always had difficulty with the
challenge he threw out at that time. He asked what was really theoreti-
cally wrong with separate-but-equal. I have never really been able to
fully answer that question. I suppose on an abstract conceptual level,
or on a highly analytical level, one could logically defend the separate-
but-equal doctrine, but the problem with it was that there was never
* Professor Kurland coined the phrase "egalitarian revolution" to characterize one of the
dominant movements in the United States Supreme Court between 1954 and 1964. Kurland,
Foreword "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the
Government", 78 HARV. L. REv. 143 (1964).
** Kenneth S. Tollett, Distinguished Professor of Higher Education and Director, Howard
University Institute for Study of Educational Policy. A.B., 1952, J.D., 1955, M.A., 1958, Univer-
sity of Chicago.
I. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. After over thirteen years of research Professor Crosskey published two monumental
volumes on the Constitution entitled 1 & 2 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN
THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1953). These volumes, together with extended lectures on
the historical and contextual background of the Constitutional Convention and the adoption of
the United States Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the Reconstruction Amendments, were the
major substance of his two four-hour-per-quarter courses. The volumes have been both severely
criticized and woefully neglected or disregarded; the former because of his untraditional criticism
of Jefferson, Madison, and Justice Frankfurter the latter because of his unconventional interpre-
tation and painstaking research into the documentary and detailed background of the Constitu-
tion. I was most impressed with his ruthless integrity of intellect and Olympian powers of legal
analysis and organization displayed in his writings and lectures.
I was so impressed with Professor Crosskey that I wrote my Master's dissertation on his books.
K. Tollett, William Winslow Crosskey and the Constitution (M.A. dissertation, Univ. of Chicago,
1958).
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any sincere intention to enforce it practically.3 I think that may be the
root of the problem in the analysis of the Brown decision that Professor
Kurland laid out before us today. On a high level of abstraction and
logic, if the injunction of the Constitution is to provide for all persons
equally and if citizens in fact experience equality, what's wrong with
separation? I suppose Professor Kurland's point about the first amend-
ment's protection of freedom of association may be the best way to
attack separation as prohibited conduct. When I went through the ex-
perience with Professor Crosskey and when I heard the discussion this
morning, what came to mind is the problem in law of the different
levels on which one has to operate in trying to address or deal with this
problem.
One can deal with the problem philosophically and probably irre-
sponsibly. Chastened by experience one can deal with it practically.
To deal with the problem practically one usually will not have as much
fun. Practically, one has to think about the consequences of what one
says or does. Philosophically, I am an analytical positivist,4 but you
would never know it. I write articles as if I am a sociological jurisprude
when it comes to law,' because I am biased or not disinterested.6 I am
committed to pursuing the interests of blacks and you will soon see
how that is the case. Because of the peculiarities of the black experi-
ence in this country, a Black can indulge in the luxury of being very
philosophical about desegregation, but only with great peril. In this
arena, I think a Black has to be extremely practical.
3. See Cumming v. Richmond, 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
4. Tollett, Verbalism, Law andReality, 37 U. DET. L.J. 226 (1959); Tollett, The Legalization
of Social Ordering in VALIDATION OF NEW FORMS OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION (G. Dorsey & S.
Shuman ed. 1968).
5. Eg., Tollett, Political Questions and the Law, 42 U. DET. L.J. 439 (1965); Tollett, The
Viability andReliabiliy ofthe U.S. Supreme Court as,4n Institutionfor Social Change andProgress
BenVicial to Blacks (pt. 1), 2 BLACK L.J. 197 (1972), (pt. 2), 3 BLACK L.J. 5 (1973).
6. History is largely a melancholy catalogue of almost endless strife, exploitation, and
oppression prompted by zealots of various ideological persuasions seeking to impose
their perfect perception of good and evil upon others. All ideologies should be ap-
proached with skepticism so that one never gets the over-weaning conviction that any-
thing and everything are justified in order to realize one's particular ideological outlook.
I believe the greatest moderating influence for the control of ideological excesses is frank
and open admission of ideological biases and predispositions. This is a minimum re-
quirement for intellectual honesty and integrity-intrinsic values of the intellectual en-
terprise of an institution of higher education. The ultimate intellectual values are the
passion and the desire for explanation which come reliably only from the pursuit of truth
and knowledge.




II. THE LAW'S DELAY, THE INDIFFERENCE OF OFFICE
Now, for my major observations on the problem of desegregation
and the Brown decision, I would like to begin with this paradoxical
proposition: For reasons of culture, social relations, and economics,
Brown could have been more easily enforced at the time it was decided
than it could be today. And in that respect, I suppose, I agree with
Professor Kurland that instead of the "all deliberate speed" proposi-
tion, the Court should have required desegregation immediately.' To-
day, because of uneven development and certain economic gaps that
expand and narrow between blacks and whites in the North and the
South, it seems that the spirit of Brown is more difficult to enforce than
in 1955. It is my feeling that because of the delay, evolution of the
Brown principles into Green,8 Swann,9 Keyes,' ° and Milliken" had to
come to counter past evasion. Although those latter decisions do seem
to suggest an overreaching-maybe even an imperial-judiciary, those
expansive remedies are necessary because of the failure to properly en-
force Brown when it was first enunciated.
Most blacks were in the South in 1954. If you could have gotten
beyond the race question, almost any index by which you measure the
patterns of behavior of a people-social, cultural, attitudinal, life-
style-southern blacks and southern whites were close. One of the rea-
sons Jimmy Carter did so well in the black community in the South
and the North is the certain social-cultural affinity that existed between
the born-again populist and blacks throughout this country. But the
chance to enforce effectively the decision at the time it was first ren-
dered is now lost. That brings me to the next stage of my analysis.
III. "THE ONE PERVADING PuRPosE" REDUX
What is the proper interpretation of the equal protection clause?
How should it be applied in integration? How should it be applied in
affirmative action? I'd like to advance a view that contemporary cir-
7. For a discussion of the "all deliberate speed" formula as an example of conceptual insti-
tutional racism, see Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Approach, 24
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 581 (1977). See also Tollett, Justice is the Reversal of Discrimination, in AD-
VANCING EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY: A MATTER OF JUSTICE 27 (C. Smith ed. 1978).
8. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
9. Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
10. Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
11. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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cumstances compel and that also would have been acceptable in 1954
or 1955-a race-conscious interpretation of the Reconstruction Amend-
ments. Whether it would have been proper then, or not, I think it is
proper today because the country has failed to do justice to the blacks
at different stages of history and thus the original pervading purpose of
the Reconstruction Amendments still obtains. We should regard the
Reconstruction Amendments as race-conscious. Justice Miller, I think,
first suggested a race-conscious interpretation of the equal protection
clause in the Slaughter-House Cases:2
We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of
discrimination against negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will
ever be held to come within the purview of this provision [Equal Protec-
tion Clause]. It is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency,
that a strong case would be necessary for its application to any other) 3
Justice Miller, after enumerating the "onerous disabilities and bur-
dens imposed upon the colored race," the curtailment of their rights "to
such an extent that their freedom was of little value," which the thir-
teenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments sought to correct, had
earlier stated:
We repeat, then, in the light of this recapitulation of events, almost too
recent to be called history, but which are familiar to us all; and on the
most casual examination of the language of these amendments, no one
can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found in them
all, lying at the foundation of each, and without which none of them
would have been even suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave race,
the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of
the newly made freemen and citizen from the oppressions of those who
had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him. It is true that only
the 15th Amendment, in terms mentions the negro by speaking of his
color and his slavery. But it is just as true that each of the other articles
was addressed to the grievances of that race, and designed to remedy
them as the fifteenth. 14
That summarizes the essence of the Reconstruction Amendments.
I have been trying to advance the view for some years that if one
starts with those statements of Justice Miller in the Slaughter-House
Cases and approaches the Constitution in the way Justice Marshall did
12. 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36 (1873).
13. Id. at 81.




in McCulloch v. Maryland 5 and Justices Douglas and Goldberg did in
Griswold v. Connecticut,16 we then can easily infer a pro-Black meaning
and interpretation of the Constitution. I call this a "structural" ap-
proach to the Constitution. 17 What do I mean by this? If one looks at
the mischief addressed in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth
amendments, each dealt in some aspect with the oppression of blacks.
Individually, none would necessarily or entirely be pro-black, but be-
cause these amendments all focused on blacks, they collectively import
more than any one of them individually entails. Just as Chief Justice
Marshall extracted the power to create a corporation and a bank' not
from any specific provision of article one, section eight, but from a se-
ries of provisions construed together, we can infer a pro-black meaning
from the collection of amendments addressing problems faced by
blacks. Structural analysis is analogous to the legislative principle of
interpretation in pari materia. Griswold v. Connecticut found the right
of privacy through the same approach. No specific provision in the Bill
of Rights grants the right of privacy, but a series of provisions that
touch, concern, or intersect interests cognate to privacy enabled the
Court to infer that right. The same thing can be done with the Recon-
struction Amendments.
IV. THE ONE PERVADING PURPOSE DEFERRED AND DENIED
Of course, we have the unfortunate situation that what Congress ini-
tially sought to enforce the Supreme Court itself began to undo by the
most ingenious and disingenuous constructions of the Reconstruction
Amendments and Civil Rights Acts. Immediately after the Civil War,
many southern states enacted Black Codes to reenslave the slaves. In
1886 Congress passed the Civil Rights Act to stop the efforts of these
states to reenslave the Freedman, and adopted the fourteenth amend-
ment to ensure the constitutionality and enforcement of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. The Supreme Court has had a very sorry history in
enforcing the rights of blacks.'9 Although today we seem to look too
15. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
16. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
17. See Black, The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L. REv. 3 (1970).
Professor Black gives an excellent analysis of a structural approach to the U.S. Constitution.
18. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
19. For a detailed chronicle of the Supreme Court's breach of trust to blacks, see L. MILLER,
THE PETITIONERS: THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE NE-
GRO (1966).
Number 2]
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frequently to the Court to enforce these enactments, it may, by virtue of
a justified guilt feeling, somewhat imperially be trying to make amends
for its obvious past betrayal of blacks.
Even before the Slaughter-House decision emasculated the privi-
leges-and-immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, the Court
in 1871 reached a remarkable conclusion in interpreting the 1866 Civil
Rights Act. The 1866 Civil Rights Act provided that if a Black could
not enforce or was denied certain rights secured by the Act in state
courts, the case could be removed to a district or circuit court of the
United States. In the B/yew case,20 a four-member black family, con-
sisting of a husband and wife, a seventeen-year-old son, and a ninety-
year-old blind mother of the wife, were brutally mutilated and slaugh-
tered by two white men in Kentucky. Because Kentucky had a law
that prohibited blacks from testifying against whites in that State's
courts, the case was removed to a federal circuit court where black wit-
nesses could testify to the murder. The Supreme Court reversed the
misdemeanor conviction on the ground that the 1866 statute contem-
plated removal in cases "affecting persons" who were alive rather than
to mere witnesses. The Court reasoned that if one of the victims had
lived, it would have been permissible to remove the case for an assault
and battery prosecution, but because all the victims had died, the case
could not be removed to prosecute for murder. In brief, blacks could
secure their rights for assaults by whites, but not for murder.2'
I allude to that early decision because it put the Court's action today
in the proper historical context. We could talk about a half dozen other
decisions 2 up to Plessy v. Ferguson2 3 that indicate the miserable record
of the Court and the miserable treatment that blacks received from it.
Only three years after Plessy, a transportation case, enunciated the sep-
arate-but-equal doctrine, it was applied to education-a situation that
20. Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 581 (1872).
21. Mr. Justice Bradley, who Mr. Justice Swain joined in a dissent, remarked upon this ab-
surdity:
In a large and just sense, can a prosecution for his [a Black person's] murder affect him
any less than a prosecution for an assault upon him? . . . At all events, it cannot be
denied that the entire class of persons under disability is affected by prosecutions for
wrongs done to one of their number, in which they are not permitted to testify...
80 U.S. at 600.
22. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629
(1882); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214
(1875).




shows again how blacks have had a hard time receiving justice in our
society, and even from the Court. The case was Cumming v. Richmond
Count, School Board,24 in which a Georgia citizen brought a class ac-
tion in an attempt to insure educational opportunities for blacks in se-
nior high school. Richmond County, Georgia, did not have a senior
high school for blacks; nevertheless, the Court held that the separate-
but-equal doctrine should apply to education as well as to transporta-
tion. Moreover, just because Georgia had inadequate funds in the
County to provide a separate high school education for blacks was no
reason either to force blacks' attendance in the white high school or to
close the white high school. So from the very beginning, the Plessy
doctrine meant separate-but-unequal.
V. BETWEEN THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURT FALLS THE
BLACK EXPERIENCE
Now the question is, how do we attain a racial reconciliation? I be-
lieve that many criticisms can be made in the abstract about several of
the desegregation decisions after Brown and Professor Kurland has
made them all. But the difficulty I have when I review these criticisms
and even when I listen to Professor Kurland's remarks is that whatever
has been done to try to move blacks ahead, it has been somehow inge-
niously frustrated by the courts or the legislature in the name of state's
rights, neutral principles, or, most recently, racial neutrality. The prob-
lem with Brown from the very start was that somehow, in some way, it
was not as important to enforce the constitutional rights of blacks im-
mediately, as it would have been to enforce the rights of others. That
failure, I think, has brought on the great difficulties in this area. Now
that I propose a pro-Black interpretation of the Reconstruction
Amendments, I am told that it is divisive; that you should not say that
those particular constitutional provisions are primarily for the benefit
of blacks. You're going to lose friends; you're going to shatter the coa-
lition. What coalition?
We are in a curious situation today. We have one of the most afflu-
ent states in the union enacting a Proposition 13, partially in reaction to
inflation, but also in reaction to social services that benefit the poor,
particularly blacks. We have the notion-I suppose it was revived at
the University of Chicago-that government can accomplish more by
24. 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
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doing less. Adam Smith's laissez-faireism condemns social and govern-
mental intervention in the free market of life; this is not the time to
decide to try to do so much. It's not just a question of an imperial
judiciary, but also a question of an interventionist federal government,
whether executive, legislative, or judicial. Neoconservative opposition
to governmental interventionism, however, is based upon the convic-
tion and perception that most social problems are intractable or inscru-
table and subject to haphazard forces that frustrate reform efforts
because of the unintended consequences of well-intentioned policies
and programs. Neoconservative noninterventionism is a rejection of
reason and the human capacity to effect constructive change.
Why is it that at every turn the blacks and other oppressed, similarly
situated groups are met with ingenious and subtle arguments to thwart
their efforts to be treated as human beings, to be treated with dignity
and respect? I certainly agree with the end of Professor Kurland's re-
marks that there is some question of how far we have actually come in
terms of racial reconciliation.
In closing, I think that the way you look at Brown, or Green, or
Swann, or Bakke,25 depends largely, I'm afraid, on the interests with
which you are primarily concerned. This is not to say that everyone
who disagrees with me is hostile to blacks or bigoted. It is to say that
they identify with different interests and the interest of blacks is not
very high on their agendas. I hope that twenty-five years from now we
will not have another symposium like this one in which a lecture can be
made like Professor Kurland's that shows in some respects how little
progress has been made, given the opportunities and possibilities avail-
able to us when the Brown decision came down. Law is the refinement
of a human aspiration to be civil, decent, and humane. Is it asking too
much of the Court to require this of the law, especially in the case of
blacks, to keep out of the "Shadow," 26 to effect "the one pervading
purpose" of the Reconstruction Amendments?
We like to think that the rule of law transcends the selfish pursuit of
a particular interest, and for that reason we all have to be committed to
a rule of law. Yet realistically, I have the gnawing feeling that there are
forces out there and people out there attempting to block the progress
and citizenship recognition of blacks at each turn. Whether it was the
25. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
26. See J. FLEMING, LENGTHENING SHADOW OF SLAVERY: A HISTORICAL JUSTIFICATION
FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR BLACKS IN U.S. HIGHER EDUCATION (1976).
[Vol. 1979:421
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enforcement of the Public Accommodations Act of 1875,27 or the provi-
sion of a high school for blacks in a Georgia town in 1899,28 or the
opportunity for blacks to go to medical school in 1978,29 prolific pun-
dits and profound professors found reasons to advance arguments that
blocked or retarded black progress.
27. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
28, Cumming v. Richmond, 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
29, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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